Thoughts on Deliberative Democracy

(an essay from my 2008 Democracy and its Critics class at Columbia University)

In this essay I will argue that deliberation is the only way for modern democracy to maintain legitimacy. In putting forth my argument I will first invoke Carl Schmitt’s theory of democracy and why he believes that democracy in the modern world is incompatible with deliberation. I will then counter Schmitt’s argument with Jurgen Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy which explains how and why deliberation is compatible with modern democracy, and indeed the only legitimate form of democracy in the modern age. I will then conclude the essay by stating why I believe Habermas’ argument is more persuasive.

In his essay “The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,” Schmitt abdicates that deliberation, or parliamentary as he calls it, and democracy are incompatible because democracy presupposes equality. Schmitt agrees with Burke that true deliberation is a process in which people come together to reason and discuss by abstracting from their own common interests in order to discover the truth or “the general will.” However, such deliberation is no longer possible in the modern age because 1) societies are too big, 2) interests are too diverse, and 3) the masses have entered politics. Thus, people are no longer able to extract from their own self-interest for the common good. The result is that today parliamentary is a process of bargaining and arguing for our own self interests, making politics a place of conflict and war, and not a place for discovering and fostering the common good. Hence, the idea that an agreement can be collectively reached in a rational manner for the sake of the general will is dead in Schmitt’s mind, who famously states, “you can paint flames on a radiator and call it a fireplace, but it does not change the fact that it is still a radiator.”

This raises a problem for Schmitt who believes politics is the place for decisions not deliberation. Schmitt’s answer, much like Aristotle and Plato’s answer, is that democracy, because it requires equality, presupposes exclusion (or equality between classes). Schmitt agrees with Rousseau that the general will only constitutes a small portion of society in the modern age. Thus, extrapolating form Rousseau, Schmitt posits that in order to gain equality and attain true democracy in the modern age, and hence know what the general will is, you must first define the demos (it could be religion, race, etc). Then once the demos is defined you must divide people up into groups accordingly, excluding those who do not fall into the demos. Then everyone within the demos will have the same interests and there will be no need to detach one’s self to deliberate, making politics a realm for the general good once again. This is the only way democracy can be compatible with parliamentary and politics in Schmitt’s mind.

Habermas in contrast believes that reason is not dead in modern times because there is no truth to be reached—no general will---only an approximation of the truth, or the general will. In Habermas’ mind rationality is a combination of things that have an implicit nature plus one’s own opinion or nature. More specifically, reason still exists because it is 1) post-metaphysical, and 2) inter-subjective. Because of this, deliberation in Habermas’ mind is compatible with modern democracy.

In explaining how democracy is compatible with deliberation he first develops a procedural conception of rationality that he calls communicative rationality, or the ideal speech situation, which consists of a set of requirements/principals that must be applied in order to come to an approximation of the truth. Those principals are 1) Inclusivity, 2) Equality, and 3) Orientation towards reaching an understanding, or, towards reaching the common good. He states that the process itself is not rational but you can find what is rational by going through the process. He agrees with Rousseau and Schmitt that in modern society interests are too diverse, thus making the general will an impossible concept to attain. But with his system of rationality you simply have to come to an approximation of what the truth, or the general will is. Because the truth, and the general will change with time, so does what is rational, and therefore, whatever a representative group can agree upon at one particular point time is what is rational. The caveat is that in knowing this, every rational outcome can be criticized because we know it is never the ideal. However, this is ok because of modern conditions and the legitimacy the process bestows upon the outcome.

Habermas believes this type of deliberation is compatible with democracy because institutions and laws are created based on this process, and are thus legitimate, as equality and rights are part of the process of deliberation. He goes on to state that democracy and rights can exist together because they are co-original—they presuppose each other: Democracy presupposes rights because democracy is a procedure for instituting a deliberate institution, and thus, if you want to set up a deliberative process then you need to give everyone certain rights; Rights presuppose democracy because in order for rights to function they need legitimacy through democracy. Thus, deliberative democracy is the only legitimate form of government in Habermas’ mind.

In conclusion, I agree with Habermas because 1) his theory is more practical—it takes into account the constraints of modernity, and 2) reason does not have to presuppose ultimate ends, which if it does, can create despotism and hinder evolvement. If, like Schmitt, one believes the truth can and must be found, then you have reached the pinnacle of knowledge, nothing can change. This stymies evolvement and is incompatible with changing circumstances. Habermas takes this into account with his theory and in so doing supplies legitimacy to deliberation and democracy in the modern age.