The white House announced this week that a decision on any troop increases in Afghanistan is still weeks away, but the debate nonetheless rages on over how those troops will be used. On the one hand there’s the “hawkish” all or nothing argument advocated by General McChrystal, and people like senator McCain who believe it’s going to take at least 40,000 more troops to pacify the country. On the other hand you have the “dovish” argument that no matter how much blood and treasure we invest in Afghanistan we can never win, so end the war, bring our troops home, and do it quickly. And then there’s the middle of the road argument advocated by Vice President Joe Biden who thinks that instead of increasing troops we should refocus the troops we do have there on disrupting terrorist cells and eradicating Al Qaida, not securing regions and/or nation building. Since these are the options being pondered, they are worth a closer look.
The Doves
There is always a great debate between the hawks and the doves in any war, but the doves are least likely to win this round. For one, they have wrongfully accused Obama of falling back on a campaign promise to end the war in Afghanistan. Obama made no such promise. On the contrary, he promised to end the Iraq war in order to focus our resources in Afghanistan; a war that he thought had been neglected because of another war that never should have happened. Secondly, the pacifists and extreme left have polarized the doves’ argument in this instance, just as Cheney and company have polarized the hawk’s argument for escalation. The far left has given a whole slew of reasons as to why the war in Afghanistan can never be won: the Afghans don’t want democracy and never did; they hate us; they are too corrupt; they are all extremists; they are incapable of ruling themselves; they are too set in their tribal ways; if the Russians and Mongols couldn’t pacify Afghanistan we can’t either; and most notably, you’re putting our troops in harm’s way over there. There is truth to some of these statements, but that truth has also been overblown and exploited.
There is no evidence that the majority of Afghans hate the U.S. and democracy. Indeed, recent accounts from Afghanistan, like Dexter Filkins’ of The New York Times Magazine, indicate that the majority of villagers are grateful for the new schools and other facilities being built by U.S. troops. Their only complaint is that there are not more U.S. troops living in the villages to protect those facilities and their lives from the extremists.
Afghan society is indeed set in its tribal ways, but that does not mean it is ungovernable or that some form of democracy cannot take hold their. The ever-increasing stability of Iraq is also challenging the notion that democracy cannot exist at all in the Middle East. The key point to remember here is that democracy takes time, even in advanced countries like South Korea and India, of which Afghanistan does not come close socially, economically, or politically.
However, the rallying cry for the far left seems to be that anything other than de-escalation will continue to unnecessarily put our troops in harm’s way. This is a taboo subject, as no country wants to see their sons and daughters die on the field of battle, but consider these numbers: there are 60,000 troops in Afghanistan already, if McChrystal gets his 40,000 that will equal 100,000 troops total. In 1953 we had over 300,000 troops deployed in Korea; at the height of the Vietnam War we had 500,000 troops deployed there; during WWII, 1.2 million; during WWI 4.5 million. As far as casualties, in Afghanistan the U.S. has currently suffered 907 casualties over nine years; in Iraq the number is at 4,360; Korea: 33,742; Vietnam: 58,209; WWI: 116,708; WWII: 416,800. So even though Afghanistan is a long war, our troops have fared pretty well compared to previous wars, and deployments are historically low.
Another thing to remember that seems to get lost in this argument is that the U.S. has a volunteer military, and because it is voluntary it is the most specialized, highly educated military in the world. The majority of Americans who sign up for the armed forces do so because they want to serve their country, and they do so knowing that they will probably see combat at some point. Yes, the fringe benefits are good, but I highly doubt that the majority of our troops joined the military solely for that reason, and if they did, then perhaps they should not have joined. What is more is that this seems to be a rallying cry mostly from those who have not served. Rarely have I met a vet that has protested a war because of combat duty. And the notion that our Generals and commanders are unnecessarily putting our troops in harm’s way is pure propaganda. Our Generals don’t want to see our troops dying anymore than we do, and they do not place them in areas they do not think they can protect or defend. Those who make such accusations need to remember that Afghanistan is a war. People die on both sides in war. The only thing to protest here is whether Afghanistan is an honorable war—a war pertinent to national security. I am of the impression that Afghanistan is both; it is a dirty war as all guerrilla wars are, but it is honorable and pertinent. I think Obama feels the same way. The result is that the doves will lose this round of the debate, but every year the war drags on their argument will gain ground.
The Hawks
On the other end of the spectrum is the hawkish argument, supported by the generals and most conservatives. The gist of the argument is: send more troops, dig in for the long haul, and nation build. McChrystal has come to the conclusion that this is the only way to win this war, and to do it he needs 40,000 more troops. The key, as was the key in Vietnam and is the key in all insurgency wars, is winning the hearts and minds of the people. How do you do that? In short: you protect the people and make their lives better (i.e. nation build). Why is this so important? Because if you can’t protect the people from the Taliban then they will not cooperate with you in rooting out the insurgents for fear of retaliation; if you can’t make their lives better they have no real incentive not to, and in some cases, alternative but to join the Taliban. To this end General McChrystal has designed a strategy that not only focuses on eliminating insurgents by capture or death, but by getting them to put down their arms, or preventing them from taking up arms, in exchange for a better life. This strategy worked in Iraq, and it is in line with General David Patreaus’ thinking that “you cannot kill your way to victory. At some point you have to start making people’s lives better.” It is also a product of one of the lessons McChrystal took away from Iraq, which is that “killing insurgents worked there only because it was a part of a much larger effort to not only defeat the insurgency but also to build an Iraqi state that could stand on its own.”
Sounds like a noble cause, but it won’t be easy and McChrystal knows it. Yet, he believes he can achieve it by changing the way we engage the enemy in order to cut down on civilian casualties—a major source of propaganda for the Taliban. McChrystal has also changed the protocol for how our troops interact with civilians, demanding that his troops “think about how you would expect a foreign army to operate in your neighborhood, among your families and your children, and act accordingly,” and, “to respect the safety and wellbeing of the people.” Sounds like one way to win the hearts and minds of a people. But can changing the way we think and act allow us to accomplish something in Afghanistan that no other country has been able to accomplish?
McChrystal seems to think so if he gets his troops, and if anyone has the credibility to make such an argument it’s him. His special forces were largely responsible for the success of the surge in Iraq, and his strategy is based on General Petreaus’ successful ‘clear and hold’ strategy used in Iraq. The problem is American’s are impatient when it comes to war, and nation building, a key element of McChrystal’s strategy, takes a lot of time. How much time? Well, considering Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world—a lot of time. Unlike Iraq, which already had an infrastructure to be improved upon, Afghanistan has no infrastructure, which means we basically have to build a nation from scratch.
To put the enormity of such a task into perspective, consider these numbers: Afghanistan is ranked 181 out of 182 countries on the UN’s Human Development Index; the average life expectancy is 43; less than 30% of the population can read; and GDP per capita is just over $1,000. These are some pretty startling numbers, and what they basically mean is that we can build and build and create all kinds of new jobs until our heart’s content, but those jobs can’t be filled and that infrastructure maintained until we send the entire country to school. Sound daunting? Well, it is, and many have argued impossible.
Still, one can argue that we have a moral and strategic obligation to try. Morally, because it is one of the poorest countries in the world; strategically, because failed states are breeding grounds for terrorists. If we leave many experts have argued that it will not be weeks or months before the Taliban return, but days. And who’s to say that the Taliban won’t support Al Qaeda and other terrorists groups like they have in the past once they do return? These are questions I’m sure Obama is grappling with at the moment, along with the fact that in March, Afghanistan will become America’s longest war. This puts tremendous pressure on the president to show some progress on the issue, and soon.
Yet, it is my sense that if McChrystal gets his troops he’ll likely only have a year to turn things around before the doves gain the upper hand. That’s not much time, especially since top commanders have stated that even with the 40,000 troops it will take 3-5 years before any real progress begins to take hold. Nonetheless, I’m convinced that if McChrystal can’t show things are improving in Afghanistan within a year’s time, the Afghans will be left to their own fate (i.e. a return to Taliban rule). That’s a sobering thought when one considers how much blood and treasure we’ve already spent in Afghanistan. But it’s also the reality of guerrilla warfare, and those who want to win the war but do it without draining our coffers and having our soldiers killed should keep that in mind—I’m sure the president will before making a decision.
In the end I think McChrystal gets his troops. I say this for several reasons. First, I got the sense that this week’s visit to Dover air force base had a dual purpose: to honor our troops, and to prep the nation for a troop increase. By making such a visit Obama is essentially conveying to the nation that “although I am going to continue this war and try to win it, I do so with a heavy heart and the utmost respect for those on the ground helping me to do so.” Second, Obama respects McChrystal and his opinion. He asked for his honest, professional assessment and he got it. When Obama handpicked McChrystal he made an investment in him and put his own reputation on the line. Now Obama will want to give McChrystal the chance to prove himself. Or, as Henry Kissinger puts it, “Those in the chain of command in Afghanistan, each with outstanding qualifications, have all been recently appointed by the Obama administration. Rejecting their recommendations would be a triumph of domestic politics over strategic reason.”
The only question then is how many troops will McChrystal get? Will it be on the higher end of McChrystal’s 40,000, or the lower end? It is my sense that it will be the former, if not the entire 40,000. Thus, look for a troop increase and for the war to continue for at least another couple of years.
The Middle Road
And then there are those who argue for a middle ground, often called the Biden plan: send less than half of the 40,000 troops requested, none at all, or scale back troops and refocus the strategy from nation building to simply training Afghan military and police forces and going after Al Qaeda—the reason we went in there in the first place. Or, as Dexter Filkins puts it, “American Special Forces units, aided by predator drones, can keep Al Qaeda off balance, while American forces stay on to train the Afghan forces and police.” The only problem with this strategy is that Al Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan; they are in Pakistan (where we are already doing drone strikes), Yemen, and Somalia.
Such a strategy also undermines a key element of McChrystal’s strategy, which is to cut down on civilian casualties and gain the respect of the locals. It’s awfully hard to do that when you don’t have troops on the ground and you’re blowing people up from the sky. In fact, it’s a sure fire way to enrage the population, like we’ve done in Pakistan. Our drone program there has been highly successful, but we often take out 10 civilians for every bad guy we kill. Why does that matter? Well, because as McChrystal puts it, “Taliban is not a finite number,” for every two Taliban we kill out of ten we don’t have eight remaining enemies, but more like 30 because the friends and family of the Taliban members you killed, and of the civilians you killed while trying to get at the Taliban all want to exact revenge. And by the way, those drone strikes are only possible if you have good intelligence. And what is good intelligence contingent upon? That’s right, the locals. So the way I see it, there are some serious flaws in the Biden plan; flaws that Obama will hopefully weed out before making a decision in support of such a strategy.
Yet, there is emerging another compelling middle ground strategy as of late, almost a compromise between the Biden and McChrystal plans advocated by Henry Kissinger and Thomas Ricks: nation build, but only in the highly populated areas, and leave the fringe areas to the drones and Special Forces. Why might this be a good idea? Well, because of the type of war we are fighting. Kissinger explains it like this:
In Vietnam, the guerrillas often ceded control of the territory during the day and returned at night to prevent political stabilization. Therefore, in guerrilla war, control of 75% of the population 100% of time is more important than controlling 100% of the territory 75% of the time. A key strategic issue therefore, will be which part of Afghan territory can be effectively controlled in terms of these criteria.
Fareed Zakaria holds a similar view, “…it is easier for us to deny [Al Qaeda and the Taliban] territory than to insist that we control it all ourselves—we can fight like guerrillas too.” So basically what is being argued is that some stabilization is better than none at all, which is what will likely happen if we spread our troops out thinly across the entire country. The hope of such a strategy, I assume, is that the stability in those key areas will eventually seep out to other regions once democracy begins to bear fruit and the economy improves. But this raises another key point, unless the Afghans can produce a stable government and cut down on corruption it won’t matter how many areas we can hold.
In the end, I don’t think the Biden plan will be used unless we start looking for an exit strategy, which Obama is not ready to do yet. However, this argument, like the dove’s argument, will gain favor the longer the war continues. On the other hand, the Kissinger/Ricks plan is an interesting strategy; one I hope is looked at closely by the Obama administration. Something to keep in mind however when considering a middle ground strategy, or a compromise, is that there is always the chance that you will simply sustain the bleeding without ever healing the wound—and that does defeat the purpose and exhaust the coffers.
Final Analysis
Generals want to win wars not elections, so they tend to be blunt and leave the politics to the politicians. But in the end, wars are dictated by politics, and politics tend to be dictated by poll numbers in a democracy. Thus, at the end of the day, Obama and McChrystal’s biggest obstacle to winning in Afghanistan will not be the Taliban or Al Qaeda, but democracy—both in Afghanistan and at home. If a credible democracy does not take hold soon in Afghanistan the country will never stabilize, nor will it be able to sustain any progress we do make there. But the bigger obstacle is democracy at home, as both Johnson and Nixon discovered. Citizens of a democracy simply haven’t the patients for long wars, and it is those citizens who ultimately determine who stays in power and who goes in a democracy. And guess who always loses: the war time president. Our enemies in Vietnam knew this, and the Taliban and Al Qaeda know this. Yet, our enemies have always exploited the fact that democracy is as much a system of values as it is a form of government during times of war, and this reality will not change in Afghanistan. There are simply things we cannot do as a nation if we are to uphold our ideals, other than to stand firm on those ideals with the hope that they will eventually expose our enemies for who they are. Thus, winning the war in Afghanistan will rely as much on Obama’s diplomatic and public relations skills as it will strategy on the ground, two things so far Obama has been good at. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking, and the fate of an entire nation is at stake. So take all the time you need Obama to ponder the next move… Just get it right.
Bibliography and Works Cited
"Can The War In Afghanistan Still Be Won?" Newsweek 19 Oct. 2009: 36-37. Print.
Fick, Nathaniel C., and John A. Nagl. "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition." Foreign Policy Jan.-Feb. 2009: 42-47. Print.
Filkins, Dexter. "His Long War." The New York Times Magazine 18 Oct. 2009: 36+. Print.
Goldstein, Gordon M. "From Defeat, Lessons in Victory." The New York Times 18 Oct. 2009, Sunday ed., Opinion sec.: 9. Print.
Herb, Jeremy. "A Few Good Men." Newsweek 09 Nov. 2009: 13. Print.
"Human Development Report: Afghanistan." Human Development Index. United Nations, 2009. Web. 04 Nov. 2009.
Kissinger, Henry. "Deployments and Deplomacy." Newsweek 12 Oct. 2009: 38-40. Print.
"Military Casualty Information." Deparment of Defense. 06 Nov. 2009. Web. 06 Nov. 2009.
Petraeus, Gen. David H. "The General's Next War." Foreign Policy Jan.-Feb. 2009: 48-50. Print.
Sorely, Lewis. "The Vietnam War We Ignore." The New York Times 18 Oct. 009, Sunday ed., Opinion sec.: 9. Print.
Thomas, Evan. "McChrystal's War." Newsweek 05 Oct. 2009: 28-33. Print.
Zakaria, Fareed. "The Case Against a Surge: More troops won't solve Afghanistan." Newsweek 19 Oct. 2009: 20. Print.
Zakaria, Fareed. "The Third Surge? TheTroops Need A Smarter Version." Newsweek 2 Nov. 2009: 20. Print.
Posts
.jpg)
No comments:
Post a Comment