Abstract
This paper examines the viability of a “soft power” approach to counter-terrorism; more specifically, the possibility for, and virtue of, a less militaristic approach to America’s global war on terror. Thus, the counter-terrorism strategy put forth in this paper is Muslim fundamentalist focused and demographically sensitive. Within this context, my theory focuses on values and their appropriate strategic use during times of war as well as their preventative power during times of peace. In arguing the virtue of such a strategy I examine both Muslim and Western histories then make the argument that a clash between the West and Islam as well as a clash within Islam is taking place. The second portion of my paper contends that adherence to a set of universal values is possible in a counter-terrorism strategy by showing that Islamic/Western grievances are more a product of the two civilizations similarities than it is their differences. The final portion of my paper states what is needed for the success of such a strategy and it examines possible tactics within. Finally, I will put forth recommendations for implementation of such a strategy as well as back up my reasoning with surveys and studies that promote the viability of this type of counter-terrorism strategy.
Introduction
This paper focuses on a long-term solution to religious international terrorism; more specifically, Islamic global terrorism perpetrated against the West. I hypothesize that this type of terrorism is a result of: (1) an extremist few, and (2) an increasingly globalized and modern world in which some societies are being left behind. I argue that many Islamic states are being left behind not necessarily because they are weak or resource-limited, but because of certain religious constraints, which are inherently value-based and brought about by a Muslim resurgence within the midst of both wealth and poverty. Thus, the West is fighting a world view first and foremost, not an armed nationalist or ideological movement, and I am of the view that the West must recognize this if it is to formulate and implement a successful counterterrorism strategy within the extremist Muslim world.
Important to remember when considering such a strategy, however, is that this “global war on terror” is unique. It is unique because: (1) it is a war of values not ideology, statehood, expansion, or any of the other commonly known reasons for war in the 19th and 20th centuries, and (2) because the enemy hasn’t a home address (i.e. they are non-state actors). It hence follows that because the fight is unique the strategy must be unique as well. One cannot fight a non-traditional war by traditional means, and that is what this paper is about.
I am of the opinion that in order to combat such a terror the West must focus on a long-term preventative strategy that is value based and psychologically focused rather than a strategy that is reactionary and violence-dependant. I believe such a long-term strategy can and should be exemplified through the use of soft power rather than military force, as the objective in such a war is hearts and minds, not state capitulation (because there is no state). This objective cannot be achieved by submission (i.e. overwhelming force) only conversion, and conversion is subject to good will and reason through action. Thus, my strategy is dependant upon what Akeel Bilgrami calls the “silent Muslim majority,” a population more sympathetic to goodwill and evolvement than to the violence and stagnation of extremism.
I believe such a strategy is possible because of the existence of universal values, a concept in which all other elements within my theory will stem. It should be noted, however, that such a construct is often frowned upon as too complex, ambiguous and indefinable. I recognize this inclination but nonetheless believe it is unfounded. For this reason I will attempt to prove in this paper that universal values are not simply an abstract concept, but that they are concrete and to a certain extent definable. Thus, my choice to focus on such a concept should not be looked upon as an excuse to avoid further analysis of the already recognized litany of counter-terrorism strategy, but rather an attempt to shed light upon a misunderstood, and little studied, concept for the purpose of its utilization within the realm of international relations and military strategy.
Thus, my paper is a counter-terrorism paper, but it is unique in that the tactic of focus is: (1) long-term; (2) proactive rather than reactionary—it is preventive-offensive rather than responsive-offensive; and (3) it is reliant upon the use of soft power rather than military force—it is moral/ideological rather than realpolitikal (however, this is not a pacifist paper as one will see in later sections).
In making my argument I have divided the paper into three sections: Clash of Civilizations; Values as Key; and Implementing a Value-based Strategy. The Clash of Civilizations section will examine the global war on terror as a product of culture, religion, and history. But it will also explain why the clash within Islam is more important than the clash between Islam and the West. The Values as Key section will explain why this is a war of values more than anything else. It will also convey the reasoning behind my counter-terrorism strategy and supply an outline for discovering universal values between the West and Islam. And finally, the Implementing a Value-based Strategy section will reveal some tactics to be used in a value-based counter-terrorism strategy.
Clash of Civilizations
Why did 9/11 happen? Is Islam only fighting the West or is it also fighting itself? As my theory is reliant upon Samuel Huntington’s thesis that a clash of civilizations is taking place, in this section I will analyze his theory and explain why it is: (1) relevant to understanding the global war on terror, and (2) why the West must look at this war as a battle for hearts and minds not terrorist capitulation. This is important for the legitimization of my theory, as I advocate that universal values are the key to a successful long-term counter-terrorism strategy. Hence, in this section I will examine the rhetoric and reasoning of the current global war on terror within light of such a civilizational clash.
In 1996 Samuel Huntington published, “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.” Now thought to be a seminal work within the constructivist paradigm, when first published it was not well-received within the field of political science, as it went against the popular paradigmatic norms of realism and liberalism. Huntington theorized that civilizations, not states, act the way they do not because they are self-interested actors within an international world of anarchy and power struggle, as realism advocates, or because their behavior is shaped by ethics, institutions, and the struggle for consensus, as liberalism advocates , but because of ethnography, or rather, civilizational identity, which Huntington describes as:
…the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes them from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people.
In describing his thesis Huntington states that “culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world…” which in turn is creating “a civilization based world order.” Thus, states Huntington, “Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences.” Cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences, however, are in large part a product of a civilization’s religious preference.
History and Religion
Historically Christianity is the single most important characteristic of Western civilization, giving the Western Christian peoples a strong sense of community amongst one another distinct from there relationship with other civilizations. In comparison to Islam, states Bernard Lewis, “Christianity and Christendom represent a greater number and longer period [than Islam]—more than 2 billion people, more than twenty centuries, and even greater diversity. Nevertheless, certain generalizations can be and are made about what is variously Christian, Judeo-Christian, post-Christian and—more simply—Western civilization.”
Islam, however, cannot be so easily generalized, as it denotes both a religion and a civilization. Lewis states:
Islam is not only a faith and practice; it is also an identity and loyalty – for many, an identity and loyalty that transcends all others … [Islam] can be properly understood only within the context of Middle Eastern perceptions of identity and against the background of history. Even the concepts of history and identity require redefinition for the Westerner trying to understand the contemporary Middle East.
The depth of this statement is more easily understood if one considers that Western civilization has a history prior to Christianity, Islam does not. For this reason, religion, more than any other civilization, encompasses all aspects of Muslim life. There is no history prior to Islam, no politics outside of Islam, no economics, war, education, culture or tradition absent of Islam. In short, Islam is all—it is life—it is the state.
In the West we simply call such states theocracies , but this term can be misleading, as it does not truly convey the extent to which Islam dominates not only the state but the entire culture and civilization. Both our inability as Westerners to grasp this fact and Islam’s inability to understand and adapt to our notion of the term is partly due to the fact that the “state” is a Western invention. Not until after the fall of the Ottoman Empire was Islam introduced to the Westphallian system. Before then the entire Islamic civilization had always lived as one nation composed of tribes. Indeed, unlike Westerners, “Muslims… tend not to see a nation subdivided into religious groups,” states Lewis, “but a religion subdivided into nations.” Hence, to Muslims, the idea that Islam could be divided into “states” was not only absurd, it was impossible. The Turks understood this and ruled accordingly, Europeans did not.
The above is an example of a fundamental difference in Western and Islamic thought that can be accredited to the two civilizations opposite views on the concept of a divide between church and state. This is absolutely crucial in understanding why these two civilizations are so incompatible. Both Christianity and the West recognize a division between church and state and have therefore found a way to reconcile the two. This is exemplified in Lewis’ statement, “The Founder of Christianity bade His followers ‘render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things which are God’s’ (Matt. XXII:21).”
Islam, however, does not, nor has it ever, recognized this divide. “In the universal Islamic polity as conceived by Muslims,” states Lewis, “there is no Caesar, but only God, Who is the sole sovereign and the sole source of law.” Or, as Huntington puts it, “In Islam, God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar’s junior partner.” This is important to note for any Islamic counter-terrorism strategy, as there is no other major religion today that advocates the state be ruled by God other than Islam.
Despite this fundamental difference, both civilizations have nonetheless advocated war in the name of religion. The most notable of the religious wars between the two civilizations is of course the Crusades, which lasted off and on over a period of 200 years. Battles between Christians and Muslims, as Lewis conveys, are in large part a product of the two religion’s shared triumphalism. Lewis states:
In contrast to other religions of humanity, including Judaism [Christians and Muslims] believe that they alone are the fortunate recipients and custodians of God’s final message to humanity, which it is their duty to bring to the rest of the world… Christendom and Islam are two religiously defined civilizations that were brought into conflict not by their differences but by their resemblances.
This alone speaks multitudes about the validity of a clash between these two civilizations and is extremely important to note when looking for universal values between Islam and the West.
Just as important to note, however, is that the West first fought its wars in the name of the state, then in the name of religion. Not until Constantine initiated the Christianization of Rome did the church hold any sway over the state. This single act had a lasting effect upon Western civilization for hundreds of years. Not until Queen Elizabeth’s declaration that the church would no longer have a say in political matters would Western wars once again be conducted solely for political reasons. In Islam, however, all wars were and still are today conducted in the name of religion, as “Muhammad,” states Lewis, “[was] his own Constantine.” The distinction here, however, lays in the notion that the West tended to use religion for political purposes (i.e. expansion for the state in the name of religion) where as politics have always been a means to religious ends in Islam (i.e. expansion for religion in the name of the state, as the state only exists as a product of religion).
Yet, even though both civilizations have fought wars in the name of religion, it should not be overlooked that Islam is a civilization and religion founded more upon war than anything else. Hence, unlike the West, all Islamic expansion was done in the name of Islam and for the glory of God, not the state or the king, and Christianity, although it is a product of Judaism, is not compatible with the warring philosophies of David and Solomon, the great state-establishing kings of Judaism. Lewis writes:
In Islam, the struggle of good and evil acquired, from the start, political and even military dimensions. Muhammad, it will be recalled, was not only a prophet and a teacher, like the founders of other religions; he was also a ruler and a soldier… [Thus] from the lifetime of its Founder, and therefore in its sacred scriptures, Islam is associated in the minds and memories of Muslims with the exercise of political and military power.
Indeed, there are many passages in the Qur’an which advocate war in the name of Islam as a Muslim duty or right of passage to heaven. For instance: “A day and a night of fighting on the frontier is better than a month of fasting and prayer; He who dies without having taken part in a campaign dies in a kind of unbelief; God has promised reward to all who believe, but He distinguishes those who fight, above those who stay at home, with a mighty reward; [and] Paradise is in the shadow of swords” (as qtd. in Lewis, 2003, pp. 30, 32).
This warring tendency within Islam is best explained by the religious concept of jihad, a duty bestowed upon all Muslims which requires them to suffer or fight for Islam. The root meaning of jihad is struggle, but it “has been variously interpreted to mean moral striving and armed struggle.” Jihad can be declared only against infidels and apostates, and those who partake in Jihad qualify for rewards in both worlds. The closest equivalent to jihad in Christianity is the Crusade, but the crusade does not hold the same connotation or relevance to Christianity that jihad does to Islam. For one, the Crusade was never advocated by Christ or his Apostles, like jihad was by Muhammad and his prophets. The Crusade was a development of the church and state, not scripture, and in that sense it was a departure from Christianity. Another major difference is that the Crusade never stuck, and today it has a quite different meaning in Western culture than it did in the thirteenth century. Now, rather than war, it represents any generally large, humane struggle, such as that of human rights or restoration of the environment. In contrast, jihad has the same meaning in Islam today that it always had, with the exception of Islamic fundamentalists whom distort it for personal reasons and political ends.
Thus, the religious divide between the West and Islam is great, as is religions sway on each civilizations culture and world view. This must be understood if the West is to prevail in this clash. What is more, any antiterrorism strategy focused on winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim world must take this into account if it is to produce results of any significance.
A Clash Within
Simply attacking the terrorists will not solve the problem. Westerners must win over the hearts and minds of the civilization the terrorists claim to represent. Thus, important to my thesis is Akeel Bilgrami’s claim that the current war on terror is as much the product of a clash within Islam as it is a clash between Islam and the West. The silent clash Bilgrami speaks of is a product of Islam’s conflict with the modern world (i.e. secularism) which amounts to a Muslim identity crisis. Bilgrami believes that such a crisis has created an extremist vocal minority and a moderate silent majority, which are perhaps just as sympathetic to many Western values as they are to Islamic ones. Lewis concurs, stating:
The Muslim world is far from unanimous in its rejection of the West… There are still significant numbers, in many quarters perhaps a majority, of Muslims with whom we share basic cultural and moral, social and political beliefs and aspirations; there is still a significant Western presence—cultural, economic, diplomatic—in Muslim lands, some of which are Western allies.
The key is getting those “allies,” or as Bilgrami puts it, that moderate majority, to speak out against the extremist minority. Bilgrami believes one way to do this is through democracy, but I will argue in later sections that democracy alone is not enough—universal values must also be recognized and applied before democracy can even take hold in the Middle East. Key to my thesis, however, is Bilgrami’s belief that secularism and Islam can co-exist, as “secularism is merely a political doctrine about how citizens agree to live and flourish together,” regardless of individual thought and convictions of the heart. This simply means that people of all faiths must give and take a little for the sake of peace and happiness. People that are willing to do this are ‘moderates’ in Bilgrami’s view. And the fact that these ‘moderates’ far outnumber the absolutists is the focus of Bilgrami’s argument and pertinent to my counter terrorism strategy.
The Minority
In order to understand the moderates we must first understand the extremists they are up against. Who exactly then are this minority—these religious terrorists? Most Islamic terrorists of today, including bin Laden, are a product of the 1970s Islamic resurgence that began in Egypt. The movement encouraged a return to purist Islamic thought and created a core of religious radicals who were against the “apostate” Muslim leaders of the Middle East. After the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, however, most were rounded up and imprisoned and tortured, but many escaped to Afghanistan, later fled to the Sudan, then returned once again to Afghanistan with bin Laden as their leader, and a new global agenda. There, bin Laden, under sanctuary of the Taliban, built training camps and sheltered and funded aspiring terrorists as well as formed ties with many already established Islamist terrorist groups. Now, the global Salafi Jihad exists in groups, or cells, dispersed across the Muslim world, with a bottom up strategy of mobilization and coordination.
In general, most Islamic terrorists are from Arab countries and Islamic immigrant communities in the West. “In terms of socio-economic background,” states Marc Sageman, “three fourths come from upper and middle class families… grew up in caring families, [are] mildly religious… over 60% have some college education, [and] most are in the technical fields, such as engineering, architecture, computers, medicine and business.” In addition, Huntington states that most terrorists joined the fundamentalist movement in their late 20s to early 30s as urban migrants. In general, these attributes constitute the majority of Islamic terrorists within the global jihad, fundamentalist fold.
Now that we have an idea of who the terrorists are, how do we know they are a minority? We know they are a minority because of: (1) their covert status; (2) their dispersion; and (3) their tactics, which exemplifies their weakness and their desperation. Regarding these points, Martha Crenshaw states:
More important than the observation that terrorism is the weapon of the weak, who lack numbers or conventional military power, is the explanation of weakness. Particularly, why does an organization lack the potential to attract enough followers to change government policy or overthrow it? One possibility is that the majority of the population does not share the ideological views of the resisters, who occupy a position so extreme that their appeal is inherently limited.
This is true for al Qaeda. If they had the support of the majority of Islam then they would not need to hide from their own society, nor would they have to resort to violence on the cheap in the form of hit and run strategy. They could simply rely upon the technology and where-with-all of the pre-existing military institutions within each Islamic state. But they cannot because they are not supported by the state. Indeed, most states in the Middle East will not have them. Bin Laden was first kicked out of Saudi Arabia, then Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, and finally Afghanistan, and he is currently being pursued again in Pakistan.
Second, how do we know this minority are extremists? Once again, because of their tactics. “For the new style terrorists, the slaughter of innocent and uninvolved bystanders’ is not ‘collateral damage,’” states Lewis, “It is the prime objective.” Suicide bombings and the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians are not normal acts of warfare, or violence for that matter. But perhaps the Islamic terrorist’s most extreme tactic of all is his deliberate attempt to make the violence as painful and disturbing as possible for propaganda purposes. The kidnappings and filmed beheadings and dismemberment of Western journalists and contractors for display on the internet is undoubtedly one of the grosses displays of violence and inhumanity every committed.
Yet this drives home another point, not only do states not condone such vicious behavior—neither does the Qur’an. Thus, we further know this minority are extremists because of their manipulation of Islamic holy law. They proclaim to be committing acts of violence in the name of Islam, yet the Qur’an does not condone what they are doing nor the way in which they are doing it. On the contrary, the Qur’an gives detailed specifics on the conduct of warfare during jihad, such as “Be advised to treat prisoners well; Looting is no more lawful than carrion; God has forbidden the killing of women and children; [and] Muslims are bound by their agreements, provided that these are lawful.” What is more, writes Lewis, martyrdom pertains only to those killed at the hand of another during jihad, “suicide, by contrast, is a mortal sin and earns eternal damnation, even for those who would otherwise have earned a place in paradise.” There are even detailed descriptions in the Qur’an about weaponry and how it can and cannot be used. “The stated reason for concern,” writes Lewis, “is the indiscriminate casualties that they inflict. At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder. At no point—as far as I am aware—do they even consider the random slaughter of uninvolved bystanders.” Thus, Osama bin Laden’s call to all Muslims to join him in killing any and all Westerners in the name of Islam is a bastardization of Islamic holy law.
Yet, this only exemplifies the fact that the goals of such extremists are not religious at all, but political, as are the goals of all terrorists. This should not be underemphasized, and it should be exploited in any value-based counter-terrorism strategy that aims to discredit radical Islamist rhetoric.
The Majority
Now that we know who the extremist minority are, who then are the “moderate majority” that Bilgrami speaks of? In essence, they are the rest of the Muslim world. They are the same majority that exists outside of the extremists in the West. They hold predominantly to one faith and embrace a common set of wants and values, such as love for their family and life in general, a want of peace, good education, good health, advancement, and opportunity. They are not necessarily looking for a lifelong crusade or cause, nor do they have time for one. They simply want, like all of us, to live a happy and comfortable life. Yet, they are either not yet convinced that the terrorist are entirely wrong to speak out against them, or they fear that by doing so they may somehow betray themselves and their culture. Bilgrami states, “Even moderate Muslims feel that to criticize their own people is letting down, somehow capitulating to a long-standing history of being colonized and made to feel inferior.” Such a feeling is understandable and can be likened to the sentiments of many Americans during the first few years after 9/11. To criticize any of Bush’s policies was to face alienation and confront fears of being labeled “unpatriotic,” and of somehow siding with the terrorists.
Thus, Bilgrami believes that the majority of Muslims do not support terrorism. Yet, at the same time, they really have little inducement to speak out against groups (terrorist or other) that identify with them civilizationally, and they have even less motivation to speak up for a civilization that has done little for them economically and politically. Such an assumption, however, leaves open the door that they (the silent Muslim majority) can be persuaded to act otherwise if only they were given strong reason and support to do so. The U.S. and the West must supply this reason and support and it must not only come in the form of economic and political support, but it must also be civilizationally sensitive (in the case of Islam more religious-sensitive than anything else) and value based.
To do this we must as Tony Blair states in a 2007 article in Foreign Affairs: (1) remember that “extremism is not the true voice of Islam,” and (2) “empower moderate mainstream forces to defeat their reactionary components.” Yet, to do this we must thoroughly understand what we (the West) are up against, in both the fundamentalists’ and the moderates. We must also be patient and more understanding, less reactionary, and most importantly, adhere to the moral norms we set for ourselves. “We know,” states Blair, “that you cannot defeat a fanatical ideology just by killing its leaders; you have to defeat its ideas. We will not win… unless we win at the level of values as much as that of force.” That is the point of this paper—that is the key to my counterterrorism strategy.
Summary
The purpose of this section was to familiarize the reader with the type of battle the U.S. is up against in the global war on terror in order to better understand the reasoning behind my counter-terrorism strategy. We now know that this war on terror is an unconventional war and, hence, conventional tactics alone will not be adequate. We know it is an unconventional war because it is as much a war between civilizations as it is a war between fundamentalists. And because it is a war between fundamentalists it is a war of values.
We also learned in this section some of the similarities and difference between Islam and the West. For instance, we know that one major difference between our two civilizations, and hence our world views, is the acceptance of a separation between church and state. One of the major similarities between our two civilizations is that we both adhere to a triumphalist religious ideology and are hence both very proud, nationalistic people. These similarities and differences must be the starting point for a value-based counter-terrorism strategy.
What is more, saw in this section many things that a value-based counter-terrorism strategy will have to contend with in order to be successful. Such a strategy must take into account Islam’s proud past and warring tendencies. Consequently, those charged with implementing a counter-terrorism strategy must thoroughly understand fundamentalist rhetoric and motive within greater Islamic society so as not to undermine the Western cause. The West must not allow itself to fall into a bait and switch mentality, and the best way to do this is to adhere to our values.
Thus, any counter-terrorism strategy must be long-term. The West must be patient and disciplined, as the goal is winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim majority, not the fundamentalist who will never change their minds about the West. Consequently, any counter-terrorism strategy must also be value-based, with a focus on values that both civilizations share. Such a strategy is not impossible, as the West and Islam do share some values. These values must simply be weeded out and applied to the strategy. I will attempt to explain how this can be done in the next section.
Values as Key
The theory behind my counter-terrorism strategy is universal values, but many are skeptical of this concept. Thus, convincing the reader that these values exist will be my most difficult task, but it is also the most important in regards to my counter-terrorism strategy. I have already alluded in the previous section that the West and Islam are more similar than different, in large part due to their religions both originating from Judaism. This in itself implies the two civilizations have many values that are similar.
What are these values though? How do we find them? First, it must be accepted that a list of any such values will be broad. They will be based on human and societal needs, nature and instinct, and religious dogma not cultural identity and tradition. With that in mind I can recommend what to look for when searching for universal values between the West and Islam, and I can even recommend a course of action for creating a list of these shared values.
Because the West and Islam are both products of the same religion and because values are most often the product of religion the West can first look to Christian doctrine to understand its own core set of values as well as its various constitutions and the rights guaranteed within: in essence, the West must know its history. This would be a good start. The next stage in formulating a value-based counter-terrorism strategy for the West would be to look to Islamic doctrine, as well as history, for similarities between holy books and constitutions, then formulate a strategy that incorporates those similarities—those shared values. Then the West must simply act in accordance with those values if the West is to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic world. Or, the West could simply do unto others as it would have done to itself. With this approach a list of universal values would not even be necessary, as we all have similar basic needs and emotions that allow us to recognize generosity and hate as well as feel pain and love in a like manner. Although this seems simple enough, actually finding leaders willing to implement such a process and sustain it, as well as convincing scholars that such an action is not futile, is where the rub lies. Nonetheless, the process is worth examination, and laying it out on paper is a start.
With that in mind, every strategy must have a goal, or grand strategy, in which it hopes to attain by implementing that strategy. I am of the opinion that any value-based counter-terrorism strategy must make peace in the Middle East its grand strategy, or its political goal, not elimination of the terrorists. Without peace in the Middle East, a value-based, or any other based strategy for that matter, will be unproductive and moot. I am also of the opinion, like Bilgrami, that democracy will be an important element in attaining this peace, but I believe that the West must be willing to accept an alternative form of democracy than in the West. If democracy is to take hold in the Middle East it will probably first take hold as a theocratic democracy, that is, rather than political parties their will be various religious parties. Whether such a democracy can work is debatable, especially with Islam’s uncompromising past and warring tendencies, but it will be a start nonetheless, and perhaps from there it will evolve through the processes of deliberation and checks and balances into a less religious form of democracy.
It follows then that in promoting our cause and implementing our strategy we must: (1) accept peace in the Middle East as the ultimate goal; (2) accept that democracy is key; and 3) accept that the form of democracy in the Middle East will probably not be like that of democracy in the West. All of this means that the West must act in a certain way when intervening in the Middle East and when trying to instill democracy. Regarding this matter, Kimberly Zink Martin alludes to an argument by David Chandler pertaining to intervention in general that the West should heed when dealing on the ground in the Middle East:
…The international community is trying not to create new institutions in BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], but to instill a new culture, with values and attitudes that would not have arisen on their own. In other words, the international community is engaged in a mission to bring western liberal democratic values to an area of the world where they had not taken root before—even when the means that are used are sometimes neither democratic nor liberal.
This view makes the idea of using force for the purposes of peace seem less ethical because now instead of simply policing a collapsed state one is tampering with that state’s culture, society, and political ideology—and that is wrong. Or is it? Richard K. Betts, director of Columbia University’s Institute of War and Peace Studies reminds us in his essay The Delusion of Impartial Intervention that we should not confuse peace with justice. Betts believes this to be a main factor in the U.N.’s unsuccessful peace endeavors after the Cold War. Betts states, “Most international interventions after the Cold War were not driven by the material interests of the outside powers but by their moral interests: securing peace and justice. Peace and justice, however, are not natural allies, unless right just happens to coincide with might.”
I agree with Betts assessment in regards to short-term peace endeavors in a specific state, but I don’t agree with such a prognosis when looking at the overall macro picture, or wars between civilizations like that between the West and Islam. This type of war is a much broader psychological war, and in a war for the hearts and minds of a civilization there can be no peace without justice. Both sides in this broader war must feel as if they are being treated fairly and that entails justice.
Thus, I agree with Chandler in the sense that justice must be involved in attaining peace in the Middle East, but I disagree with him that it is Western justice that is the problem, and that other ideologies and religions don’t look upon justice in a similar way. After all, are genocide, rape, and tyranny not bad in all cultures, religions, and societies, and is it not just to try and put an end to them? Political ideologies aside, are these not things that all people want security from if for no other reason than it is the human condition—the want to live without fear of death or pain? If they are, then one must ask, is the want of peace, happiness, and security really a liberal democratic idea, or is it just human nature—wants we are all endowed with?
In his essay The Challenge of Co-Evolution Peter Eisenberger of Columbia University states that human nature is the product of two axioms: (1) our role as species is to use our capabilities to survive, co-evolve, as long as we can, and (2) that we should use knowledge to the extent possible and evaluate it logically in the pursuit of our role. If this is true then we all have more values in common than we would like to believe. What is more, this means that our religions have more in common than we would like to believe as well. Eisenberger states, “While the above axioms appear to be secular in nature they really are aligned and can be viewed as having their origins in the values shared by religions which also herald our use of knowledge to be good.”
Therefore, I disagree with those that hold the belief that states that push peace, diplomacy, and guaranteed rights to all in order to protect them from suffering and death are pushing an ideal and values on a culture that would not have otherwise materialized. How can something materialize that is already there? Thus, if these ideals and values were already there to begin with then their un-realization is simply a product of suppression; a halting of the evolutionary process of civilization and man’s natural drive to progress. And this halting, as seen in the previous section, is being done by a fundamentalist few with a political, not religious, agenda.
In line with this type of thinking is Bilgrami’s belief that the majority of people in a society do not side with the tyrants, but that they too want to be secure from despotism, death, suffering, and suppression. Democracy can loose these chains, but Bilgrami states that many in a society are reluctant to openly admit this. Why? Because they do not want to lose their identity. But we must ask then, if these are all basic wants then how is admitting that one is human losing one’s identity?
When looked at it in this way we can see then that the problem is in the word, not the idea. The word is democracy; the idea is peace and happiness. Thus, the problem is not in forcing values or guaranteeing needs and wants that were already there to begin with, but in labeling these values and basic ideas Western. However, this is absurd because democratic liberalism did not create people or human nature, rather it is the opposite, human nature and a person’s want of certain things created democracy. And this is where values comes into play and is most relevant. It is most relevant because it is the point that will allow the other two points, getting the silent/moderate Muslim majority to speak up, and allowing for democracy to take root, to be realized in the Middle East.
Tony Blair states, “Islamist extremism’s whole strategy is based on a presumed sense of grievance that divides people against one another. Our answer has to be a set of values strong enough to unite people with one another.” Bilgrami believes this is key because “even moderate Muslims feel that to criticize their own people in any way is letting down, somehow capitulating to a long-standing history of being colonized and made to feel inferior.”
However, we have already established (1) that because certain values are universal they cannot be claimed by one society and promoted as such, and (2) that the fundamentalists are most responsible for Islam’s sense of grievance and inferiority. Thus, if certain values are superior and can prove it through their being consistently used by the West than so be it, but their ownership is not confined to western enlightenment. Hence, Blair states, “We have to show that our values are not Western, still less American or Anglo-Saxon, but values in the common ownership of humanity, universal values that should be the right of the global citizen.” Bilgrami believes that the key to achieving this is at the psychological level.
Like Bilgrami, I believe that the West must know its skeptics thoroughly, it must know their past, their culture, their religion, their motives, and then act according to its understanding of these elements—used to the advantage of peace, not the advantage of Western corporate interests. The key to peace, then, lies in a thorough understanding of one another, and the key to understanding one another may rely on changing the way we think, and most certainly on the way we act in the Middle East.
Stereotypes and Diplomacy
Just as democracy has been labeled Western, so too has Islam been labeled hateful and violent, but neither of these are true. They are a product of “groupthink.” We label first, then reason based on the label, but we should and can do the opposite. Psychology professor, Peter Gray, states:
Judgments relating behavior to character go in both directions. People not only assess character from behavior; they also interpret behavior in terms of what they already know – or think they know – about the person’s character. A person’s physical features, or information that we have heard about a person, can influence our interpretations of the person’s actions in ways that can be quite unfair.
The same can be said about religion and culture. At the core, we all value the same things. Eisenberger states, “It has been deeply reassuring to me to realize that our advanced knowledge and all the major religions point to some common wisdom and values.” An understanding of this is where diplomacy comes into the equation, and it is also where diplomacy has failed us. We need to change our diplomatic tactics. Instead of resorting first to threats, refusing to sit down and talk with certain nations, and reverting to force as anything other than a last resort we must first truly try to understand each other’s stance, and this can only be done face to face and with an open mind. If we can do this we might discover in the end that we are all after the same things. This does not guarantee peace or even agreement, but it does enrich understanding of the situation between the groups involved
In line with this type of progressive thinking, Bilgrami states, “What needs to be done depends on how we diagnose the moral psychology of Islamic politics today in different parts of the world.” This is a two-way street however. It implies a deeper psychological approach, not only of Muslim psyche, but Western as well. A nation must know itself before it can pretend to know other nations. Once that is achieved then a nation needs to recognize standard, universal, moral goals and ardently pursue those goals without ulterior motives. “It is our values,” states Eisenberger, “now as in the past that will determine whether the capabilities our powerful knowledge enables are used for good or evil. The power of our knowledge means we need more than ever to unify our reasoning and our values.” In light of this, if a nation’s actions replicate just values it is hard for that nation’s enemy to criticize it for what it stands for. However, if the use of a set of universal morals for the purpose of ulterior or unjust ends is the motivating factor then the process is moot and even more damaging than if a country had not attempted to discover these universal values at all.
Obstacles to Peace
The key then to peace in the Middle East is values. And because the problems in the Middle East are a product of cultural differences a forceful peace will not solve the problem. It will only make the matter worse. For this reason if there is to be peace in the Middle East we all need to change the way we think, and values are the catalyst for this change. This is the core of my theory, now what are the obstacles that must be overcome in realizing its end?
First we need to start thinking of values in more worldly terms. We must stop labeling them Western, Middle Eastern, or Eastern, then stop looking at them as solely Christian, Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist values. Because one esteems wisdom or detests violence does not mean one is by default a Buddhist, nor does it mean that one who honors one’s father and mother is by default a Christian. These are common world values and they are a powerful connection to all cultures, religions, and peoples of the world.
Another obstacle is clearly democracy being labeled as a Western ideal, the Muslim world’s cultural need for a unique identity holds it back, not only from democratization, but technological and ethical advancement too—all of which promote and are necessary for peace and its sustainability. Conversely, when advancement is lacking bitterness and hate will exist. Yet, the West’s stubbornness in demanding that all democracy must be in the form of Western democracy only fuels fundamentalist rhetoric and Islam’s identity crisis, and it undermines the openness and virtue of progressive thinking—the type of thinking that made both Islam and the West great civilizations.
Another obstacle is patience. Change takes time. Even if Westerners and Middle Easterners started today to understand each other better it will be many years into the future before a change is noticeable. The main reason for this is that evolution is gradual and cannot be rushed, to do so will only annul the process. Change is also a two way street; both cultures must change in order to be more understanding of each other. If the understanding is not mutual there can be no peace. I believe, however, that the West must take the lead in this process—they should set the example as they have greater means to do so.
These are the obstacles; now that they are identified can they be overcome? Yes, the same way they were realized: through dedication and a willingness to act outside the status quo.
Keys to Peace
In overcoming the divide between religion and democracy, it is key to remember that religions advocate happiness and progression of the mind, as does democracy. So from a religious standpoint, not to take into account the progressive changes in the world and make an intense concerted effort to discover how those changes can stimulate, not stifle one’s religion, is not only essential to religion’s survival but pertinent to religious doctrine and the survival of humankind.
It will also do the world well to recognize that religion is not the only ideal that changes with time, so too does political ideology, such as democracy with its amendments and ratifications—and it is not a bad thing when it does change as it signifies progression. It must further be recognized that change is uncontrollable and merely a fact of life that all people and ideologies have to adapt to. Regrettably, but quite simply, if certain countries or cultures cannot adapt to the changing world then there will be no peace for them. Islam is evidence of this, convincing them otherwise is the goal of a value-based strategy.
However, there is hope for those countries and cultures that fear change. All they need do is simply look at those cultures that have adapted and they will see that those that have made the transition have found that not only were they able to maintain their cultural traditions and attain prosperity, but that they are now part of an interconnected world, a world that not only promotes understanding of each others culture, but respect and cooperation between them.
In promoting such an idea the West would be wise to refer to Islam’s ability to do so in the past, during its rise and at its peak. It would also be wise for the U.S. to heed that it was only when Islam turned away from this ideal that it began its decline. America must be careful in its arrogance not to turn away from that which made it so great to begin with: its openness and acceptance of all peoples and cultures (an openness that resulted in the largest brain drain in world history). In concurrence with this view is Fareed Zakaria, who writes:
At the end of the day, openness is America’s greatest strength. Many smart policy wonks have clever ideas that they believe will better American productivity, savings, and health care. More power to them all. But historically, America has succeeded not because of the ingenuity of its government programs but because of the vigor of its society. It has thrived because it has kept itself open to the world—to goods and services, to ideas and inventions, and, above all, to people and cultures.
Thus, the U.S. must not undermine itself by turning away form its values in order to fight terrorism. Quite simply, the U.S. needs to continue to be what it always has been, but it must be better at it and more consistent, and in so doing, let the terrorists destroy themselves.
The West must also take advantage of globalization, not for selfish ends, but for strategic ends—that is, peaceful ends. The virtue of our now interconnected system, a system in which one country’s actions have the potential to affect us all, is that all can prosper to a higher degree and at a faster rate with the caveat, however, that respect and understanding of others is essential for the gains to continue. The system, through one’s want of happiness, has thus created a positive check that not only ensures the happiness of others and continues to advance the system, but a check that also advances humanity. In essence, technology has given us a superordinate goal that brings us all closer together, and this is beneficial for everyone, not just the West.
Summary
In summary, one can see that we must change the way we speak, the way we think, and the way we conduct diplomacy for there to be peace in the Middle East, which must be the grand strategy in the war on terror. And all of this is possible because the human species has the unique ability to change if it so chooses. The beginnings of this process, as all things, will be the most difficult because people by nature are impatient. However, I believe if the frustrating initial stages can be overcome then the process will take care of itself. People will become habituated to less violence and begin to enjoy whatever progression they have attained and covet whatever increments of peace they have felt; thus pushing the unstoppable process of peace ever closer to its end.
Perhaps this is too optimistic a view for many to accept, but I believe we have been pessimistic for far too long, and our counter-terrorism strategies have hence been created and implemented in light of this pessimism. I believe the self-sustaining attributes of pessimism have stifled our creativity and blinded the sensibilities to alternatives to peace, and in so doing induced hopeless violence upon the delicate process of diplomacy. We need a change—we need to change. Perhaps an approach less realist and liberal and one a little more human is in order. This is the idea behind my counter-terrorism strategy. Simply trying harder at what we are already doing is not enough. We must overhaul the peace process and inject new blood into the system. This will require bold leaders and determined scholars who are willing to color outside of those sovereign lines of thought, a patient public and a renewal of compassion for those we’ve grown to loathe as the enemy.
We, the U.S. and the West, have seemed to have forgotten in our rise to power and intellectual advancement that the world does not exist in theory, nor does thought exist in paradigm, and most importantly that the majority of people do not see the world in this light. It is more cut and dry for most, it is right and wrong, it is fluid and emotional, it is present and past, and this must be acknowledged for there to be peace not only in the Middle East but anywhere in the world. In acknowledging this we return to the roots, the foundation of all knowledge, which are values, and in so doing, we undermine the fundamentalists and win over the moderate majority in the Middle East. The irony in all of this is that perhaps it requires a certain amount of higher knowledge to understand that a return to basics is needed. Nonetheless, we must not allow our ascent to the meridian to destroy the mother of knowledge and blind us to the role it still plays within the bigger picture.
I believe we must put great emphasis upon this maxim for there to be peace in the Middle East and to bring and end to the war on terror. To do this we must have a thorough understanding of the human condition and allow ourselves to think as the commoner does. The scholar and the politician must use their knowledge to further their understanding of the basics so as to cater to the sensibility of the masses. We must be malleable and artistic and look at the issue from their perspective, for they are the ones who will determine whether peace is viable or not, not the politician or the scholar. In essence, the elites must become less realist, less liberal and constructivist, and more human. The process will be long and fragile with the key not within a book or a theorem, but rooted deep within the soul of humankind. Thus, values are the key. This is the answer and this is the struggle, now for implementation.
Implementing a Value-based Strategy
We now know from the previous sections that this is a war of values as much as it is a war of terror, thus, any counter-terrorism strategy must be value-based. But how do you implement a value-based counter-terrorism strategy? In two ways: militarily and non-militarily, or psychologically.
To fight the terror force will need to be applied, but so will justice, as previously conveyed. Thus, the way in which we apply force must be just and fundamentalist-focused. Any airstrikes or military campaigns must go out of their way not to harm civilians. If civilians are killed then apologies must be issued and explanations given, if for no other reason than for the sake of maintaining good public relations and some sense of moral legitimacy.
The moderate Muslim majority will watch America’s every move, they will then determine our justness by the way we conducted ourselves. And until they are convinced that America conducts itself justly and consistently they will never speak out against the extremists. Therefore, since the hearts and minds of the moderate Muslim majority are the key to winning the war, the non-military, psychological aspect of the strategy must hold precedence over the military aspect of the strategy at all times.
Strong Leadership is Key
Such a strategy will not be easy and it will require a bold and committed leader to take hold of the reigns of foreign policy and stick to his guns, as the Western public will often demand swift retribution, and dare I say vengeance, after a terrorist attack. If it is not sought then a leaders political adversaries will undoubtedly exploit this inaction as weakness. Thus, a leader must publicly commit his self to the strategy and then explain to his citizens in detail why the strategy is good and why it requires patience rather than knee jerk reaction. I believe this will do two things. Firstly, it will show commitment on the leaders part, but it will also foster commitment on the leaders part because: (1) he has already gained legitimacy by explaining the goodness of such a strategy; (2) he has prepared the public for how he will act in light of a terrorist attack; and (3) he has bound his hands to commitment by publicly announcing it—to go back on his word would be to lose legitimacy, or, as Thomas Schelling explains, lose face in the eyes of the people (enemy and ally alike).
Secondly, by publicly announcing his strategy to the public he has also announced it to the enemy, which does two things: (1) gives the state the moral high ground, and in so doing (2) puts the onus on the enemy. He has thrown down the moral gauntlet in a sense, and in so doing relinquished the initiative to the enemy. You have forced the enemy to respond, dared him to react in a sense, to prove he is more just than you. The enemy can then respond by either acting more just, in which case the strategy has worked and you have won if you stick to the strategy, or, the enemy will try to test your justness through acts of violence and injustice, in which case you still win if you continue to adhere to the strategy. This is important. Wavering on the strategy will be as bad as not having committed to it in the first place, as it will confirm fundamentalist rhetoric.
The Muslim majority will determine how closely U.S. values resemble their own by how the U.S. reacts. If the U.S. reacts violently they will give legitimacy to the terrorists’ claims, and more than likely, the moderate majority will think the terrorists’ acts of violence are justified. In short, they will not speak out against the terrorists. If, however, the U.S. condones the act, and responds in a rational, calculated manner, again, careful to explain why and how, then the prospect of the Muslim majority siding with the West and condoning the terrorists goes up—if we follow force with continued implementation of the non-military aspects of the strategy.
Military aspect
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of a value-based, long-term strategy is that of military response. How do you respond in a way that allows you to protect yourself but at the same time maintain moral legitimacy? In short, how do you fight evil without becoming evil yourself? This is a difficult question to answer, but there are nonetheless ways in which a nation can attempt to proceed with force without undermining its values. Adhering to the Geneva Conventions and implementing certain aspects of just war theory would be a good start.
The very existence of the Geneva Conventions is to decrease the destructiveness of war and minimize its adverse consequences. Every nation in the world has signed the Conventions, and in so doing, they have created a general moral obligation to follow them, if for no other reason than to protect themselves from retribution in the future. This is not to say that countries don’t cheat on the conventions, rogue states do it all the time, but they nonetheless set a high standard that is agreed upon and should be followed by a just state.
But it is a two way street, if you sign the Conventions and break them then it is almost an admission to injustice, something that is counter productive to a value-based strategy. Yet, this is exactly what the U.S. has done in its war on terror. Examples of this breech in commitment lay in the existence of the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo facilities and in the Bush Administration’s allowance of torture. Yes, the terrorists torture too, but they have not signed the Geneva Conventions, nor are their moral standards worth stooping to. Indeed, the West cannot become a snake in order to kill a snake if it is to follow a value-based strategy or the strategy is moot. Such an action only gives credence to the “double-standard” claims that Muslims abhor so much about the West. Thus, in a value-based counter-terrorism strategy Abu Ghraibs and Guantanamos can not exist, and if they do then they must be done away with. And torture must be absolutely forbidden.
Response in the Midst of Crisis
The existence of an amoral enemy leads to another problem in regards to military response: How do you respond after a major attack, like that of 9/11 when the majority of citizens demand immediate action and less than ethical retribution? This is an extremely difficult question and I am sure it will not be answered in the same manner every time, but will have to be catered to the situation. Nonetheless, the response can still adhere to some general criteria: limited civilian casualties; engagement limited to air and Special Forces attack; and of course, attacks must be target-specific.
With that in mind, perhaps one way to respond is through a “show” of force. This means retaliate, but in a manner that precludes the possibility of large scale civilian death. The retaliation must be target-focused and public. This is difficult when you are fighting a non-uniformed enemy without a home address, but it is for that reason that the retaliation is more a “show” of force than anything else. The virtue in such an act is that if the retaliation is merely a show then even over-retaliation could be sanctioned, as the display is all. For instance, carpet bombing of an insurgent area that is desolate and little populated—even the detonation of a small scale tactical nuclear weapon in such an area may be justified if civilians are not injured. No doubt such a display of force would send a strong message to both the enemy, the state that harbors them, and your own population that you are serious. This swift act of retaliation with a minimal body-count would at least buy enough time for the attacked state’s citizens to temper their emotions which would allow their leader the time to think through a more detailed and reasonable military response that adheres to a value-based strategy. In the mean time, citizens must be continually reassured that their leader is on the job as well as continually reminded of why such a strategy is best in the long run.
When a military plan of action is finally determined then it too must adhere to the grand strategy, that is it must be justified and value sensitive. An example of a justified act of war that adheres to grand strategic ends is Afghanistan. An example of an unjustified war that undermines grand strategic ends is Iraq. Afghanistan sent a message to all terrorists that the U.S. will pursue not only them but states that harbor them. That was all that was needed to induce even non-ally states to help out, like Iran and Syria. For that reason Iraq was not needed and it was counter productive to the grand strategy. Because it was unjustified and reckless we sent a message to the world that we are not necessarily just, leading many Muslims to believe the terrorists were. Our carelessness in Iraq undermined any credibility we gained in Afghanistan and any justness we proclaimed to have before Afghanistan. In essence, we relinquished the higher ground in Iraq.
One can see again how a value-based strategy is reliant upon an exceptional leader—a leader that is patient, a tactful orator, reasonable, and a leader who has the extraordinary ability to disconnect himself from strong emotions in the midst of crisis in order to respond properly, and in accordance with the grand strategy.
Non-military/Psychological Aspect
The non-military, psychological aspect is the most important aspect of a value-based counter-terrorism strategy. Hearts and minds are not won on the battlefield but after the battle is over, and if possible, before the battle begins. Yet, important to remember is that military action can be swift in attaining its end, attaining a psychological victory takes much more time. This is because people need to be convinced and in order to be convinced they need to see prolonged justice. For this reason a value-based counter-terrorism strategy requires a prolonged adherence to and a consistent display of universal values in action. Thus, my strategy is reliant upon soft power—public relations, diplomacy, aid, and propaganda. Ironically, these very elements are mockingly highlighted in a 2007 internet video by a top al-Qaeda leader (Abu Yahya al-Libi) who gives the West six tips to effectively wage ideological warfare against Muslim terrorist:
Highlight the views of jihadists who renounce violence; publicize stories of jihadist atrocities against Muslims; enlist Muslim religious leaders to denounce jihadists as heretics; back Islamic movements that emphasis politics over Jihad; discredit and neutralize jihadist ideologues; and play up personal or doctrinal disputes among jihadists.
All of these suggestions are good ideas and are compatible with, and should be thoroughly considered within the context of a value-based strategy. Let me begin with public relations.
Public Relations
Good public relations are essential to my strategy and they are best exemplified in what has become known as public diplomacy. To effectively win over the Muslim majority the West must engage in more humanitarian efforts in the Muslim world. When Muslims are in crisis, for whatever reason (natural disaster, plague, drought, epidemic, terrorist attack), we must come to their aid, and we must offer our assistance in improving their everyday lives even when they are not in dire need. Such acts of goodwill will improve our image in the eyes of Muslims and reinforce our commitment to adhere to a set of universal values, as well as reveal the virtue of doing so.
The positive effects of such acts have been documented with the result that public diplomacy is fast becoming an area of interest in the war on terror. Opinion polls before and after the Indonesian tsunami of 2003 and the Pakistan earthquake of 2005 reveal that Muslims positive perception of the U.S. increased substantially as a result of U.S. aid efforts both on and off the ground. Terror Free Tomorrow polls show that U.S. favorability among Pakistanis more than doubled after relief efforts during the 2005 earthquake, and that U.S. favorability among Indonesians one year after the 2003 tsunami more than tripled as a result of Western aid during the disaster. Similar polls conducted in Muslim countries like Nigeria, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia reveal like findings. What is more, polls show that Americans are in favor of increased aid efforts in these Muslim areas. These findings are revealing, and they speak multitudes about the virtues of a soft power approach, leading Terror Free Tomorrow to state on its website, “American humanitarian assistance can be a healing balm in relations between America and developing nations, for Muslims and Christians alike.”
Yet, in knowing the virtues of public diplomacy we (the West) should not wait for disaster to strike before engaging in humanitarian projects in the Muslim world. Outside of disaster the West can build schools; construct facilities that provide clean and accessible drinking water; donate textbooks; give free medical exams and prescription drugs; inoculations; dental exams; and prosthetic limbs. Such acts can even be as simple as giving away free hand powered radios in remote areas where access to the modern world is difficult.
U.S. Navy Captain Brian Donegan, now a Military Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, has first hand experience of the positive effects of public diplomacy. He revealed to me in 2008 that during aid efforts in Cambodia one of his doctors was greeted with a smile from an elderly woman who thanked him “for honoring her with his hands.” The translator then explained to the doctor and Donegan that she had never received medical care from a doctor before. No doubt such an act of selflessness left a positive image in her mind of Americans and perhaps the West in general. Similar findings in regards to Muslim states are revealed in research conducted by Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan who state:
Focus group research in Morocco, Egypt, and Indonesia has shown that it is possible to improve the image of the United States in the Muslim world. Although many Muslims are angry at what they perceive America does, the right efforts to communicate can produce significant shifts in attitudes.
For this to happen, however, we must change the way we think, act, and portray ourselves in the world. This is a momentous task that will not be fast or easy. Yet, I am of the impression that one way to begin the process is by allowing more Muslims to come to the U.S. This could perhaps best be accomplished by providing Muslims with more scholarships to come and study in America and other Western states. Doing so would not only improve the Western image, but it would also garner greater understanding of each others cultures and world views.
Similarly, Fareed Zakaria states, “Some of foreign policy is what we do, but some of it is also who we are.” For this reason public diplomacy must be a part of any value-based counterterrorism strategy. The positive effects of such generosity are overwhelming and undeniable. If we are to win the hearts and minds of the moderate Muslim majority then increased public diplomacy would be a good start. Richard N. Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations agrees:
It is possible to project a more favorable image of America in the Muslim world… although hostility is intense, there is an opportunity to change minds. It will take listening, a humbler tone, drawing more attention to U.S. aid to development and reform, and agreeing to disagree on select security issues. It will also require significant resources over an extended period of time. America has a historic chance to establish a new dialogue with the peoples of Muslim lands.
We should not waste such an opportunity.
The Use of Religious Leaders
Any change in the way Muslims think and act will not be accomplished by an outsider, it will have to come from within. Unless the religious elite confirm that an idea or claim from the outside world is legitimate and compatible with Islamic dogma Muslims will be hesitant to accept and adapt to that idea or claim. Thus, when trying to induce the moderate majority of Muslims to speak out against the fundamentalists the utilization of Muslim clerics of the non-fundamentalist fold would be extremely useful, and is perhaps even key to a successful soft power strategy.
We know from studies that the majority of Muslims do not adhere to the extremist interpretation of the Koran, and no doubt the majority of Muslim clerics do not either. Convincing these moderate clerics to speak out against the fundamentalists in the synagogues and in the media would be an ideal way to convince the majority of Muslims to do the same. Even the terrorists agree as was revealed in al-Libi’s internet statement (See Non-military/Psychological Aspects, p.34). These clerics know the Koran better than anyone else and can thus reveal the inaccuracies of fundamentalist claims better and in a more convincing manner than a Westerner, as they are not only scholars, but Muslims, which gives them legitimacy and sway in the Muslim world. It is impractical to believe, based on what we know about Islam, that non-Muslims will be able to accomplish this task on their own.
A Jan. 3, 2009 article in The New York Times reports on the effectiveness of such a tactic in the Arab world, but interestingly enough, it has materialized on its own and it has come in the most unlikely of forms: entertainment. The Times article describes a new breed of Muslim clerics, often labeled “satellite clerics,” who preach to youngsters a moderate Islam that is compatible with the modern world—and they entertain while doing it. Revealing is that many of these “satellite clerics” have lived in America at some point, and some were deeply troubled by the events of 9/11. What is more, that these shows tend to focus on the youth is encouraging, as the majority of Muslims are under the age of 35 and the youth gap is growing substantially each decade, a potential powder keg of animosity and extremism if fundamentalist have their way.
Yet, even though the fundamentalists speak out against these shows, they have nonetheless become some of the most popular television programs in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the results appear positive. Feelings are mixed between liberals and conservatives on the effectiveness of the programs, but one thing is for certain: they are an alternative to the fundamentalist rhetoric that so often dominates the textbooks and airwaves in the Middle East. They are also helping a new generation acclimate to the modern world; this is something that will have to happen if Islam is ever going to catch up to the rest of the world economically and politically.
Encouragingly, this “from within” tactic seems to have worked in another way in Saudi Arabia and has been labeled by The Economist as “gentle re-education.” Saudi Arabia has implemented a terrorist re-education program as part of its counter-terrorism strategy, which entails the use of clerics in prisons and a clamp down on fundamentalist propaganda in the media. As a result, the level of violence in Saudi Arabia, home to many of the most extreme Muslim terrorists, has dropped over the last two years. This particular program is geared to the ordinary Muslim caught up in fundamentalist hype and recruitment, not the hardcore leaders and soldiers of the movement.
In explaining how the program works The Economist states, “official propaganda [in Saudi Arabia] talks of extremists as ‘misguided’ or deviant. It avoids such terms as jihadi or irabi (Arabic for ‘terrorist’) because they are derived from Koranic verses with positive connotations.” The Economist goes on to state that “Saudi Arabia treats jihadists as victims rather than as terrorists. Jailed militants are offered one-on-one discussions with Islamic scholars to try to convince them that they have misinterpreted the rules of jihad.” Many captured militants spend time at a low security holiday camp in which they “spend their days in religious discussion, art therapy, sports, vocational training and psychological assessments.” When they are released the state helps them to reintegrate back into society by giving them money, helping them find a job, and even helping them to find a wife in some instances. As for the hard core militants and terrorist masterminds, they are prosecuted as regular criminals on terrorism-related charges.
Lisa Blaydes and Lawrence Rubin have recently claimed that a similar strategy worked for Egypt in quelling the militant insurgency that took place there in the 1990s. Blaydes and Rubin call the Egyptian approach “ideological reorientation” and describe it as a counter-terrorism strategy “that seeks to change core ideological or religious beliefs of the terrorist group, thus bringing the beliefs of group members in line with societal norms.” They state that the success of the Egyptian strategy lay in the tactical use of “repression in combination with negotiation and ideological reorientation to combat terrorism committed by religious extremist groups.” In fact, this strategy worked so well in Egypt that the two militant groups responsible for the violence have published “doctrinal revisions regarding the impermissibility of violence.” What is more, Western states are now studying the techniques used in Egypt in order to implement similar programs. Blaydes and Rubin state that the success of this strategy in Egypt suggests two things:
First, it suggests that the ideology of religious based groups is not exogenous and fixed, as is often assumed, but rather endogenous and flexible. Second, one may infer that ideological reorientation enjoys a long-run efficacy compared to rival approaches; this is particularly apparent when contrasted with repressive strategies which both scholarly and journalistic accounts suggest may actually increase levels of religious radicalism in a country.
These examples reveal some of the benefits of a value-sensitive strategy. They are also testament to the effectiveness of a soft power approach, which is compatible with a value-based strategy. However, they also reveal the effectiveness of an important element that must be used within such a strategy: propaganda.
Propaganda tactics
Bridget L. Nacos states, “terrorism is psychological warfare… the immediate victims of bombings, hijackings, kidnappings , and other terrorist acts are simply pawns in the plays that terrorists stage in order to engage their domestic and international audiences.” Similarly, Margaret Thatcher once said, “publicity is the oxygen of terrorism.” With this in mind, propaganda is essential to terrorism’s existence, and the terrorists know themselves that they cannot meet their political ends without it.
Just as al Qaeda uses propaganda, then, so too must the West, but they must use it better—and they can. There is no reason the West should be losing the propaganda war on terror. We have far superior technology and technical wherewithal than the terrorist do, and yet, we are losing on the internet and in the airwaves. This must be remedied, as propaganda is essential to a long-term value-based strategy on terrorism. Charney and Yakatan convey a similar view, stating:
Substantial efforts will be required to communicate more effectively. Turning information and initiatives into communications that are heard requires more actively engaging local media—including the controversial al-Jazeera—as well as paid advertising, effective spokespeople, and logos and labels on aid. Nongovernmental efforts to challenge the misconceptions common among focus group members about U.S. foreign policy, including those regarding Jewish influence, would also be helpful in breaking down barriers to communication in the Islamic world.
It follows then that we must not only stifle the terrorist propaganda but also counter it. This means we must vamp up and improve government run broadcasts like Radio Free America, which was so successful during the Cold War, but television networks as well. The potential in doing so is exemplified in Charney and Yakatan’s study. They convey that the majority of focus group members in their research received their information on America from radical satellite networks like al-Jazeera, yet “many feel they are not getting the whole story and want to learn more about America.” Thus, if Muslims are willing to listen to other points of view then we should provide the means for them to do so, but it must be legitimate, not simply government counter-propaganda, but real journalists and scholars conveying their views in a conventional manner. What is more, Charney and Yakatan also reveal that because the main source of Muslim knowledge comes from a limited and radical media system very few Muslims know about any public diplomacy efforts the U.S. or Western states undertake. Thus, for the sake of reaping the positive benefits of public diplomacy, another essential element in a value-based strategy, we must make such acts known to the Muslim world, and that can be done through the use of counter-propaganda.
Yet, reacting accordingly to terrorist propaganda is one thing, stifling it will be more difficult. It will not only be difficult because of the impossibility of preventing all venues for propaganda on the internet, but also because it will require, in large part, that the West ignore much of it. For propaganda to be affective it must be heard and promoted, thus, to ignore it is to make it moot. Nacos states, “the media report—and over report—the public watches, and decision-makers pay attention to both the media’s frenzy and the public’s fearful reactions,” which is exactly what the terrorists want. But if this frenzied end does not materialize then terrorist acts are in vain and their cause is pointless. Ignoring the terrorist will not be easy in a democracy, however, as it will require a sustained effort by both the government and the media. All the same, even if the media cannot restrain itself from over-reporting, the government can, which would undoubtedly have an effect on the media’s over-reporting—and that would be a good start.
Abu Yahya al-Libi revealed to Americans his mock-counterterrorism strategy through the use of propaganda. He stated (in review):
Highlight the views of jihadists who renounce violence; publicize stories of jihadist atrocities against Muslims; enlist Muslim religious leaders to denounce jihadists as heretics; back Islamic movements that emphasis politics over Jihad; discredit and neutralize jihadist ideologues; and play up personal or doctrinal disputes among jihadists.
What better way to do all of this than through the same source in which he revealed it—propaganda; no one dies and the costs are minuscule compared to that of military action. Thus, propaganda is an extremely important tactic to utilize in the war on terror, and most importantly, it is compatible with a “soft power” approach and value-based strategy.
Post-war Plans
Finally, any military action taken in pursuit of terrorists must have a comprehensive post-war plan. Perhaps this is a given, but the Bush administrations current handling of Afghanistan and Iraq are blaring examples of how easy it is to win the battle and lose the war. It must always be remembered that the war on terror is a war for hearts and minds not territory or domination. To devastate a country, remove its leaders, and disband its institutions without rebuilding and actually making life better than it was before is to breed resentment, hate, hamper the likelihood of democracy establishing itself, and legitimize the terrorists’ claims. On the other hand, to make the lives of Muslims better than it was before will not only legitimize the action, but also improve the Western image and the goodness of democracy.
A good post-war strategy, however, is not just rebuilding but also interacting positively with the population, adapting to their culture and allowing them a stake in the rebuilding process. It is not enough to simply set up institutions and modern facilities, the population must be shown how to use them and taught the virtue of such facilities and institutions. This can only be accomplished through face-to-face interaction.
In an interview in Vietnam in 2003 I spoke with a Vietnam veteran who now speaks fluent Vietnamese and comes back to Vietnam to visit friends at least once a year. He did two and a half tours in Vietnam in the 1960’s and revealed to me some pretty atrocious acts in which he partook in while there. At the end of the interview I asked him, “How can you be so enamored with a people now after some many years of hating them?” He replied, “Because I broke bread with them. I finally sat down and talked with them. We shared stories. We laughed. I realized we were very similar. We were both fighting because we loved our countries not because we hate other people.” My acquaintance called it breaking bread, but it can just as easily be called diplomacy or public relations. It is this face-to-face contact with the enemy on his territory and in adherence to his culture that hearts are won, and understanding attained on both sides
The 1st Division of the U.S. Marine Corp understood the virtues of acting in such a manner in Iraq. They were the first Americans to enter Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit after the U.S. invasion in 2003. They immediately went about implementing a peace-keeping strategy of Iraqi self-governance within the city. They worked hard at listening to Iraqi grievances by holding town hall meetings and maintaining constant contact with town leaders. And when they had to leave to allow the Army’s 4th Infantry Division to take over they held “a farewell dinner to cement relationships with local tribe leaders,” states Thomas E. Ricks. But although invited, the 4th Infantry Division did not attend the dinner nor were they interested in the 1st Division Marine’s tactics. The result was that soon after leaving Tikrit, reveals a 1st Division Marine history, “A budding cooperative environment between the citizens and American forces was quickly snuffed out.”
As testament to the success of such a hands-on approach, the U.S. military has recently begun to closely examine the virtue of tactics like that of the 1st Division Marine’s. An Oct. 2008 report on NPR states that policymakers are looking more closely at former Vietnam War General Creighton Abrams’ “Clear and Hold” strategy for use in Iraq. Abrams’ approach was very different than General William Westmoreland’s “Search and Destroy” strategy during the first half of the Vietnam War, which focused on body count and unrelenting military pressure much like U.S. strategy in the early years in Iraq. Abrams’ strategy as NPR explained it focused on “protecting the population, training local Vietnamese forces, providing money and programs for a better life. ‘It's the government presence with its people all over the country, reasonable security and so on,’ [Abrams] explained to his staff at a meeting in 1969.’”
The current U.S. strategy in Iraq, implemented by General David Petraeus, is heavily based on Abrams’ “Clear and Hold” strategy. Like soldiers under Abrams in Vietnam, U.S. soldiers in Iraq are now living with the Iraqi people in small bases next to towns and villages. At the same time they work with American experts to build basic municipal facilities and even market places for Iraqi townspeople. Petraeus, who has repeatedly stated that “you cannot kill your way to victory,” described his strategy to NPR as having, “an increased emphasis on securing the population and doing that, if you will, by living among the people." His strategy seems to have worked so far. Since the 2007 surge the U.S. has been able to maintain control of many of the areas they could not secure several years prior. What is more, Petraeus is currently preparing a similar strategy for the war in Afghanistan and the new Obama administration appears to be embracing it.
Thus, a sound post-war strategy is pertinent to a value-based strategy. But it must entail a hands-on approach—Americans must interact positively with the locals, and they must do it along cultural lines.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to show how a value-based counter-terrorism strategy that recognizes a set of common universal values and focuses on the use of soft power tactics is the best approach for fighting the global war on terror. In attempting to explain the virtue of such a strategy I first looked at the relevancy of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis as a starting point for understanding the great divide between Islam and the West. I have come to the conclusion that indeed such a clash is taking place between Islam and the West, but that there is also a more important clash taking place within Islam between the fundamentalists and the moderate Muslim majority—and this is the clash the West must focus on if it is to win the hearts and minds of the moderate Muslim majority.
Yet, in order to win a war of values the West must first recognize that the shared animosity between Islam and the West is not only a product of both civilizations differences, but also their similarities. Both civilizations share a long history of war between one another, and both are very proud nationalistic peoples. However, each civilization’s history and pride is the result of their adherence to triumphalist religions, both of which are a product of Judaism. Thus, because the global war on terror is in large part a product of religion it must be fought at the level of values as much as force.
Secondly, the West must make peace in the Middle East its grand strategy, and in order to do so the West must change the way it thinks about Islam and the way it acts within Islam. This will mean doing away with double standards in the Muslim world, and acting in accordance with Western democratic values, not corporate and strategic interests. It also means that the West must accept that democracy, if it is to ever take hold in the Middle East, will probably not be like democracy in the West. This will not be easy for the West, but I nonetheless believe that if the West does not at least set this process in motion it will never win over the Muslim majority.
Thirdly, the success of a value-based counter-terrorism strategy will be reliant upon good leaders and both military and non-military aspects of implementation, but the latter must take precedent. The military aspect must consist of fighting war in a more just manner. This means minimizing civilian casualties at all costs and adhering to the Geneva Conventions, as well as acting rationally in the midst of crisis, which will require patients, resolve, and articulate planning. Whereas the military aspect of the strategy is temporary, the non-military aspect must continually be in play. The non-military aspect of the strategy will be reliant upon strong public diplomacy, cooperation with moderate Muslim clerics, propaganda, and strong hands-on post-war strategies. We will need to interact with the Muslim world in a face-to-face manner, and perhaps the best way to do this is by not shutting Muslims out, but by allowing them to come to the U.S. and see for themselves the American way of life while partaking in the benefits of an advanced democratic system.
In closing, I realize that such a counter-terrorism strategy is ambitious, some may even say impractical. But my response would have to be, what is practical? What we have been doing? If the Bush Doctrine is practical then it is also unsuccessful, costly, and counterproductive. I have stated from the outset that any value-based counterterrorism strategy must be long-term. The effects of such a strategy will not be felt immediately, but the benefits will outweigh the adverse consequences of a short-term military fix. The global war on terror is an unconventional war and therefore unconventional tactics will be required. Perhaps it is time to try alternative approaches. Perhaps it is time to adhere to the values we proclaim to stand for.
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